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H. L. v. MATHESON. CAN PARENTAL NOTIFICATION BE
REQUIRED FOR MINORS SEEKING ABORTIONS?
I. INTRODUCTION
The extent to which a state can constitutionally legislate concerning
abortion has been debated and litigated since the Supreme Court ren-
dered its controversial Roe v. Wade" decision which recognized that a
woman's fundamental right to privacy under the Constitution encom-
passes the decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy 2 The con-
stitutional questions become more complicated when the state regulates a
minors access to abortion due to the unique status of female minors. Al-
though such minor's are biologically capable of conception and childbirth,
they are also potentially vulnerable and lack maturity in making in-
formed choices regarding critical matters, such as whether or not to ter-
minate a pregnancy. These factors are not present when an adult exer-
cises her constitutional right to an abortion. However, such factors
necessitate that parental rights and the state's important interest in safe-
guarding the welfare of minors both be considered when a minor seeks to
terminate her pregnancy.
Until the recent H. L. v. Matheson' decision, the Court had spoken
definitively regarding state regulation of a minor's access to abortion only
to rule that there can be no absolute third party4 veto over the minor's
abortion decision.5 H. L. v. Matheson moved a small step forward in de-
1. 410 U.s. 113 (1973). Compare, e.g., Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on
Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973) with Perry, Abortion, the Public Morals, and the
Police Power: The Ethical Function of Substantive Due Process, 23 U.C.L.A. L. Rav. 689
(1976).
2. The Roe v. Wade decision held that prior to the point where the legitimate state inter-
ests in protecting maternal health and the potential life of the fetus became compelling,
which was found to be approximately at the end of the first trimester based on medical
knowledge at that time, "the attending physician, in consultation with his patient, is free to
determine, without regulation by the State, that, in his medical judgment, the patient's
pregnancy should be terminated. If that decision is reached, the judgment may be effectu-
ated by an abortion free of interference by the State." 410 U.S. at 163 (emphasis added).
However, the Court has upheld legislative regulations even during the first trimester by
requiring the woman's written informed consent, Planned-Parenthood of Central Missouri v.
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 80 (1976); by requiring that only a licensed physician perform the
abortion, Connecticut v. Menillo, 423 U.S. 9, 11 (1975) (per curiam); and by requiring that
the procedure be deemed necessary by the physician in the exercise of his best clinical judg-
ment in light of all attendant circumstances, Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 191 (1972).
3. 101 S. Ct. 1164 (1981).
4. The two parties necessarily involved are the minor and her physician.
5. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (Bellotti II); Planned Parenthood of Central
Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 75 (1976). The first Bellotti case, Bellotti v. Baird, 428
U.S. 132 (1976), vacated the judgment of the lower court invalidating the Massachusetts
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fining permissible state regulation by ruling that the state can require
parental notification before an immature dependent minor can obtain an
abortion. However, the case also appears to signal a warning to state leg-
islatures that an exception should in some way be provided for minors
who can demonstrate that they are capable of making an informed choice
and for those minors whose best interests would not be served by paren-
tal notification.
This comment will review the current status of the constitutionality of
state-mandated parental involvement in a minor's abortion decision.
H. L. v. Matheson and the Court's earlier rulings on a minor's access to
abortion will be analyzed in terms of the principles they employ to deline-
ate the scope of the minor's right to privacy. The comment will conclude
with an observation on the application of parental notification statutes to
mature minors.
II. BACKGROUND TO H. L. v. Matheson
In Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court expressly reserved the question of
a state's right to mandate parental involvement in a minor's abortion de-
cision.' Three years later, in Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v.
Danforth,7 the Court held that a blanket requirement for parental con-
sent was unconstitutional. The Court recognized that although minors do
have constitutional rights, the state has broader authority in regulating
the conduct of minors than that of adults, thereby limiting those rights.6
The test to be applied is "whether there is any significant state interest in
conditioning an abortion on the consent of a parent or person in loco
parentis that is not present in the case of an adult. ' The Court found
that the state's interests in safeguarding the family unit and parental au-
thority were not likely to be enhanced by giving parents an absolute veto
over their minor daughter's abortion decision. 10 Therefore, parental con-
statute which the Court found susceptible to a constitutional interpretation. The case was
remanded with instructions to certify questions to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachu-
setts concerning the meaning of the statute. All references in this article are to Bellotti IL
6. 410 U.S. at 165 n.67.
7. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
8. Id. at 74.
9. Id. at 75.
10. Although the Danforth test requires a "significant" state interest to justify infringe-
ment of the minor's right, the Court did not analyze the nature or weight of the state inter-
ests. The state interests proffered were: (1) assuring the welfare of minors and (2) safeguard-
ing the family relationship, particularly parental authority. Id. at 72-73. The Court
considered only the interest in promoting parental authority and found that the means se-
lected did not further that end. Three dissenting justices criticized the failure to address
both interests, contending that the "traditional way by which states have sought to protect
children from their own immature and improvident decisions" is to require parental consul-
tation and consent. Id. at 95. See also Perry, Substantive Due Process Revisited. Reflec-
tions On (and Beyond) Recent Cases, 71 Nw. U. L. REv. 417, 455-59 (1976).
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sent could not be made an absolute prerequisite to a minor's abortion.11
The Court cautioned that the ruling did not mean "that every minor, re-
gardless of age or maturity, may give effective consent for termination of
her pregnancy." 2
The question of parental involvement in the abortion decision was next
addressed by the Court in Bellotti v. Baird.23 The Massachusetts statute
under review in Bellotti required that a minor seeking an abortion obtain
the consent of both her parents. If one or both parents refused consent,
the statute allowed the minor to seek consent from a judge of a superior
court "for good cause shown. 1 4 Parents would be notified of any judicial
proceeding. Eight justices found the statute unconstitutional but were
sharply divided in their reasoning. The result was two four-member plu-
rality opinions and no clear consensus on the extent or manner in which
parental involvement can be mandated in a minor's abortion decision.
Justice Powell announced the judgment of the Court and was joined in
his opinion by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart and Rehn-
quist. 1 5 Powell recognized that the constitutional rights of minors could
not be equated with those of adults16 because of the unique status of mi-
ll. Since the Missouri statute required parental consent only with respect to the first 12
weeks of pregnancy, the Court's ruling is actually limited to first trimester pregnancies.
"Abortions after 12 weeks of gestation are more dangerous, emotionally disruptive and ethi-
cally troubling than those performed earlier. The risk of complications and death increases
with each succeeding week of pregnancy; overall, second trimester abortions are about 10
times as dangerous as earlier procedures." Benditt, Second Trimester Abortion in the
United States, 11 FAm. PLAN. PERSPECTVS 358 (1979). Thus during the second trimester
the state's interest in protecting the welfare of the minor would markedly increase in signifi-
cance, as would the parents' right to safeguard the health of their child. It appears that
parental consent could be validly mandated for that stage of pregnancy where abortion be-
comes a greater medical risk than childbirth. Contra, Note, The Minor's Right of Privacy:
Limitations on State Action After Danforth and Carey, 77 COLUM. L. REv. 1216, 1227 n.61
(1977).
12. 428 U.S. at 75. The obvious implication is that the statute may be constitutional if
restricted to immature minors. See note 20 infra.
13. 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
14. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 112, § 12S (West Supp. 1979), quoted at 433 U.S. at 625.
15. Justice Rehnquist wrote a very brief concurring opinion, 433 U.S. at 651-52, indicating
that he joined Justice Powell's opinion because he felt that until the Court was willing to -
reconsider its decision in Danforth, the lower courts should be given some guidance.
16. The Court began to give greater recognition to the constitutional rights of minors
after In re Gault unequivocally held that "whatever may be their precise impact, neither the
Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone." 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967)
(recognizing that many of the procedural safeguards for adults tried for crimes are equally
applicable to juveniles). Delineation of the scope of the minor's constitutional rights has
continued on an ad hoc basis. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977)
(right to privacy prevents blanket prohibition of distribution of contraceptives to minors);
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977) (corporal punishment may implicate constitution-
ally protected liberty interest); Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975) (rights to notice, counsel,
confrontation, cross examination and protection from self-incrimination); Goss v. Lopez, 419
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nors, due to their peculiar vulnerability, "their inability to make critical
decisions in an informed, mature manner, and the importance of the pa-
rental role in child rearing.' 7 Although parental notice and consent are
permissible limitations for the state to impose on the right of a minor to
make many important decisions,' the abortion decision is unique because
of the impossibility of postponement and the exceptionally burdensome
consequences of pregnancy and motherhood for a young girl.19
Powell found two reasons why the statute constituted an undue burden
on a minor's constitutional right to privacy. First, the statute permitted
the court to refuse an abortion to a mature minor if it found the proce-
dure not to be in her best interests. Secondly, the statute required paren-
tal notification in every instance.20 Powell contended that notice should
not be required either (1) where a minor shows she is mature and in-
formed enough to make an independent decision; or (2) where without a
showing of maturity, she nevertheless demonstrates to the Court that an
abortion would be in her best interests."' In making this latter determina-
tion, the Court must consider the importance of encouraging a familial
rather than a judicial resolution, bearing in mind that parents naturally
take an interest in the welfare of their children. 22
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun,
concurred in the judgment that the Massachusetts statute was unconsti-
tutional but based this conclusion squarely on Danforth. Since the Mas-
U.S. 565 (1975) (extending procedural due process rights to the civil context by requiring
notice and opportunity to be heard before school suspension); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358
(1970) (protection against double jeopardy); Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503
(1969) (students may exercise freedom of expression so long as it does not interfere signifi-
cantly with the functioning of the school).
For rulings limiting the constitutional rights of minors, see McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403
U.S. 528 (1971) (no right to jury trial in juvenile proceedings); Ginsberg v. New York, 390
U.S. 629 (1968) (obscenity law concerning minors upheld because state can ban certain
materials from minors which it could not ban from adults).
17. 443 U.S. at 634.
18. In the area of "fundamental" rights, the most obvious permissible parental consent
requirement is for marriage. Other rights typically limited by parental consent requirements
include the right to view certain movies or purchase certain literature, Ginsberg v. New
York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968), and the right to purchase firearms and the right to procure many
medical services. See Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 72-
73.
19. 443 U.S. at 642.
20. Justice Powell cautioned: "We are not persuaded that, as a general rule, the require-
ment of obtaining both parents' consent unconstitutionally burdens a minor's right to seek
an abortion." Id. at 649. The parental consent requirement is not unduly burdensome where
an opportunity is provided for the minor to obtain, without parental notice, a judicial deter-
mination that she is capable of giving informed consent or that an abortion would be in her
best interests. Id. See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
21. 443 U.S. at 647-48.
22. Id. at 648. See also Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979) (formal adversary hearings
are not required for parents to commit their children to state mental institutions).
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H. L. v. MATHESON
sachusetts statute required that a minor obtain either parental or judicial
consent in order to obtain an abortion, it was clearly contrary to the Dan-
forth decision which held that the state does not have constitutional au-
thority to give a third party an absolute and possibly arbitrary veto over
the abortion decision. 23 Comparing it to the Missouri parental consent
statute struck down in Danforth, Stevens contended that the Massachu-
setts statute was, if anything, more restrictive of the two privacy interests
protected by the constitutional right to make the abortion decision,
namely "the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters
.. .and.., the interest in independence in making certain kinds of im-
portant decisions. "24
[T]he need to commence judicial proceedings in order to obtain a legal
abortion would impose a burden at least as great as, and probably greater
than, that imposed on the minor child by the need to obtain the consent of
a parent. Moreover, once this burden is met, the only standard provided for
the judge's decision is the best interest of the minor. That standard pro-
vides little real guidance to the judge, and his decision must necessarily re-
flect personal and societal values and mores whose enforcement upon the
minor-particularly when contrary to her own informed and reasonable de-
cision-is fundamentally at odds with privacy interests underlying the con-
stitutional protection afforded to her decision.
25
Stevens noted that "[n]either Danforth nor this case determines the con-
stitutionality of a statute which does no more than require notice to the
parents, without affording them or any other third party an absolute
veto. '26 He labelled Powell's opinion as advisory only in this regard. 27
The net effect of the Bellotti decision is that a parental consent statute
cannot be saved by allowing judicial consent to override the parent's veto
when an abortion is found to be in the minor's best interests. The deci-
sion cast some doubt on the constitutionality of blanket parental notifica-
tion statutes but, lacking a majority, Justice Powell's opinion could only
be considered persuasive authority for lower courts.
In H. L. v. Matheson,28 a challenge was brought to Utah's parental no-
tification statute. 29 The Utah Supreme Court took note of the Bellotti
decision and found it significant that a majority of the Supreme Court
had refused to join in Powell's opinion. The Court upheld the statute be-
cause they could not "discern a clear constitutional doctrine inhibiting
23. 443 U.S. at 654.
24. Id. at 655 (quoting Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977)).
25. 443 U.S. at 655-56.
26. Id. at 654 n.1.
27. Id. at 656 n.4.
28. 604 P.2d 907 (Utah 1979).
29. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-304(2) (1978). See note 31 infra.
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the State from enacting such a statute. '30 The case was appealed to the
United States Supreme Court, giving the Court an opportunity to defini-
tively rule on the question Powell had addressed in his plurality opinion
in Bellotti: can a state constitutionally mandate parental notification for
a minor seeking an abortion?
III. FACTS AND DECISION OF H. L. v. Matheson
H. L. was a fifteen year old unmarried girl in the first trimester of preg-
nancy, living with and financially dependent upon her parents. After con-
sulting with her social worker and a physician, she decided to have an
abortion but did not wish to inform her parents of her pregnancy, believ-
ing that it would not be in her best interest to do so. Pleadings filed on
her behalf did not allege any details of her relationship with her parents
or expound any reason why she felt that notifying her parents would not
serve her best interests. When her physician advised her that, under Utah
law,3' he could not perform the abortion without first notifying her par-
ents, she brought a class action suit3" to have the statute declared uncon-
stitutional and to enjoin its enforcement.
The trial court declined to issue either a temporary restraining order or
30. Id. at 912. Other courts have found Justice Powell's opinion more persuasive and have
as a consequence declared parental notification statutes unconstitutional. See, e.g., Women's
Services, P.C. v. Thone, 636 F.2d 206 (8th Cir. 1980); Leigh v. Olson, 497 F. Supp. 1340
(D.N.D. 1980); Margaret S. v. Edwards, 488 F. Supp 181 (E.D. La. 1980); Akron Center for
Reproductive Health v. City of Akron, 479 F. Supp. 1172 (N.D. Ohio 1979). See also Wynn
v. Carey, 582 F.2d 1375 (7th Cir. 1978) (parental notification statute found unconstitutional
prior to Bellotti but by same reasoning); Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Kansas City v. Ash-
croft, 483 F. Supp. 679 (W.D. Mo. 1980) (parental notification statute found unconstitu-
tional but no reference to Bellotti); Women's Community Health Center, Inc. v. Cohen, 477
F. Supp. 542 (D. Me. 1979) (statute requiring parental notification for unemancipated mi-
nors under 17 showed sufficient likelihood of unconstitutionality to support preliminary in-
junction restraining enforcement, thus emphasizing persuasive authority of Justice Powell's
opinion in Bellotti).
31. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-304 (1978) provides:
To enable a physician to exercise his best medical judgment [in considering a possi-
ble abortion], he shall:
(1) Consider all factors relevant to the well-being of the woman upon whom the
abortion is to be performed including, but not limited to,
(a) Her physical, emotional and psychological health and safety,
(b) Her age,
(c) Her familial situation.
(2) Notify, if possible, the parents or guardian of the woman upon whom the abor-
tion is to be performed, if she is a minor or the husband of the woman, if she is
married.
32. H.L. "sought to represent a class consisting of unmarried 'minor women who are suf-
fering unwanted pregnancies and desire to terminate the pregnancies but may not do so'
because of their physician's insistence on complying with § 76-7-304(2)." H.L. v. Matheson,
101 S. Ct. at 1167. The trial court found her to be an appropriate representative of that
class.
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a preliminary injunction because the plaintiff had made no showing of
any detriment that might be suffered if her parents were notified. Inter-
preting the requirement that a physician "notify, if possible, ' 33 the par-
ents of a minor seeking an abortion, the court held that compliance was
mandated if the physician was physically able to locate and notify the
parents. After a hearing on the merits, the trial court dismissed the com-
plaint. It held that the statute did not unconstitutionally invade the pri-
vacy right of a minor either to secure an abortion or to enter into a doc-
tor-patient relationship.
The Supreme Court of Utah unanimously upheld the constitutionality
of the statute.3 Applying the Danforth test,35 the court concluded that
the statute served significant state interests not present in the case of an
adult. First, the parents would frequently possess valuable information
about factors a physician should consider in exercising his best clinical
judgment.36 Furthermore, the state has a special interest in encouraging a
minor to consult with her parents in making a decision as important as
whether or not to bear a child. Of greater significance, the statute did not
allow for any veto; parental involvement was strictly limited to notifica-
tion and thus did not constitute an undue burden on the constitutional
right of the minor to choose an abortion. 7 The court agreed with the trial
court's interpretation of "notify, if possible," and rejected the appellant's
contention that it should be construed to leave parental notification to
the discretion of the physician "to determine if medically, socially, psy-
chologically, and physically, it would be appropriate to notify the minor's
parents."38
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, H.L. challenged the
constitutionality of the statute on the grounds that: (1) it is overbroad in
its application to unmarried girls who are mature and/or emancipated; (2)
it violates the constitutional right to privacy as recognized and delineated
in earlier Supreme Court cases; and (3) the state allows pregnant minors
to consent to any other medical procedures related to their pregnancy
33. See § 76-7-304(2) at note 31 supra.
34. 604 P.2d 907 (Utah 1979).
35. See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
36. The statute incorporates the factors which the Supreme Court enumerated as proper
considerations for a physician assessing the advisability of an abortion:
[T]he medical judgment may be exercised in the light of all factors-physical, emo-
tional, psychological, familial, and the woman's age-relevant to the well-being of the
patient. All these factors relate to health. This allows the attending physician the
room he needs to make his best medical judgment. And it is room that operates for
the benefit, not the disadvantage, of the pregnant woman.
Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192 (1973).
37. 604 P.2d at 912. The court thus found that the statute served significant state inter-
ests (i.e., satisfied the Danforth test) and that the means selected were narrowly drawn to
protect only those interests.
38. Id. at 912-13.
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without any requirement of parental notification. 9
Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justices Stewart, White, Powell and
Rehnquist, delivered the opinion of the Court which upheld the constitu-
tionality of the statute on a limited basis. The Court refused to rule on
the constitutionality of the statute as applied to mature or emancipated
minors, holding that H.L. did not have standing to make the overbreadth
challenge because she "did not allege or proffer any evidence that she or
any member of her class is mature or emancipated."'40 The Court noted
that the United States District Court for Utah had held that the statute
could not constitutionally apply to emancipated minors.41 That ruling
had not been appealed and was therefore binding on the State of Utah. In
like manner, Chief Justice Burger noted, "[w]e cannot assume that the
statute, when challenged in a proper case, will not be construed also to
exempt demonstrably mature minors. '4 2 Therefore, the Court's ruling is
strictly limited to the statute's application to unemancipated" minor girls
who have made neither a claim or showing of maturity nor any allegation
as to their relationship with their parents.44
The Court reviewed the conclusions reached in the Danforth and Bel-
lotti cases and reaffirmed the principle that a state may reasonably con-
clude that parental consultation is desirable and in the best interests of a
minor who lacks the ability and maturity to make an informed choice in
important decisions. Encouraging such consultation is a constitutionally
permissible end.45 Furthermore, constitutional interpretation has consis-
tently recognized the important rights of parents in directing the up-
39. 101 S. Ct. at 1169-72.
40. Id. at 1169. The dissent strongly disagreed with the majority's analysis of the standing
issue and based its finding of unconstitutionality on the statute as applied to all minors. Id.
at 1179-84. Justice Stevens, concurred in the judgment but did not join the majority opin-
ion. He also decided the broad issue which he believed was the duty of the Court despite the
particular fact situation presented by appellant's case. Id. at 1177.
41. L.R. v. Hansen, Civil No. C-80-0078J (Feb. 8, 1980), cited in H.L. v. Matheson, 101 S.
Ct. at 1169.
42. 101 S. Ct. at 1169. Chief Justice Burger also held that there was no basis for assuming
that the statue would apply to minors in need of an emergency procedure or to minors with
hostile home situations. Id. at 1170 n.14.
43. An unemancipated girl is a minor girl who is living with and financially dependent
upon her parents. Id. at 1170.
44. Id. This last exception is apparently intended to leave open the possibility of exempt-
ing from the statute girls who can demonstrate that notifying their parents of their preg-
nancy and intended abortion would clearly be against their best interests because of a "hos-
tile" home environment. See note 42 supra. See, e.g., L.R. v. Hansen, Civil No. C80-0078
(Oct. 24, 1980) (C. D. Utah) (minor girl alleged that her minor sister had been expelled from
home when she informed their parents of her pregnancy and abortion), cited in H.L. v.
Matheson, 101 S. Ct. at 1186 n.24; State v. Koome, 84 Wash.2d 901, 530 P.2d 260 (1975)
(father testified that he believed forcing his daughter to bear the child would deter future
pregnancies).
45. 101 S. Ct. at 1171.
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bringing of their children."6
The Court then considered the interests of the state served by Utah's
parental notification statute and balanced those interests against the bur-
den imposed on the minor, noting that the statute did not provide for any
veto over the minor's ultimate decision. Chief Justice Burger identified
both family integrity,4 with particular regard for preserving parental au-
thority, and the protection of adolescents as important state interests
served by the statute. He found the statute reasonably calculated to pro-
tect immature, dependent minors "by enhancing the potential for paren-
tal consultation concerning a decision that has potentially traumatic and
permanent consequences.' 48 The statute was found to serve a significant
state interest by providing an opportunity for parents to supply essential
medical information to the physician. The Court rejected H.L.'s argument
that the statute did not rationally pursue this end because it provided for
no mandatory delay period,49 pointing out that time is of the essence in
the abortion decision. Finally, the statute promoted the legitimate state
interest in protecting potential life.
46. Id. at 1171-72. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (right of parents to
withdraw their children from compulsory school attendance to further their upbringing in
the Amish religion); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (right of parents to
educate their children in private schools); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (right to
have children taught a foreign language). But cf. Baker v. Owen, 395 F. Supp. 294
(M.D.N.C.), aff'd mem., 423 U.S. 907 (1975) (state's right to use corporal punishment to
maintain order in schools overrides parental right to determine how child is to be disci-
plined); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (child labor law overrides parental
right to enlist child's assistance in distributing religious literature). The above cases all ad-
dress a conflict between rights of the state and those of the parents, not a conflict between
parent and child. But see Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979) (parents may commit minor
children to a mental institution without formal adversary hearings).
47. Justice Marshall disputed this in his dissenting opinion: "Rather than respecting the
private realm of family life, the statute invokes the criminal machinery of the State in an
attempt to influence the interactions within the family." 101 S. Ct. at 1195.
48. 101 S. Ct. at 1172-73. The dissent claimed that the statute does not advance the goal
of encouraging parental consultation because the statute provides for no mandatory delay
between the time the parents are notified and the abortion is performed. Furthermore, al-
though parental consultation would ideally serve the interest of protecting the minor, such
would certainly not be the case if the pregnancy resulted from incest or if a hostile home
environment assured an abusive response. Thus the statute is not narrowly tailored to serve
this state interest. Id. at 1186.
49. Since the statute provided for no mandatory delay between the time of notification
and the time of abortion, H.L. contended that the statute did not promote the stated inter-
est because there was no real opportunity for parents to bring medical information to the
attention of the physician. The dissent did not find the time element troublesome, see note
48 supra, but it did criticize the statute for failing to require or encourage the transfer of
information. Justice Marshall found it unlikely that the parents could provide much infor-
mation unknown to the minor herself; however, if this was the purpose of the statute, then
it was "patently underinclusive" because it specifically excluded married minors from the
parental notice requirement. 101 S. Ct. at 1189.
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Against these state interests, the Court balanced only the fact that
some minors may be inhibited from seeking abortions.50 Chief Justice
Burger concluded that this could not tip the scale in favor of the minor
because the "Constitution does not compel a State to fine tune its stat-
utes to encourage or facilitate abortions. '51
The Court found sufficient justification for the state to distinguish
medical treatment for a full-term pregnancy from abortion by imposing
no qualifications on the minor's right to consent to the former.52 The dif-
ferent state interest involved in full-term pregnancies and the relative ab-
sence of emotional and psychological consequences from medical deci-
sions in pregnancies warranted this distinction."' Chief Justice Burger
50. The dissent, on the other hand, carefully examined -the burdens imposed by the
statute:
[Ilnvolving the minor's parents against her wishes effectively cancels her right to
avoid disclosure of her personal choice.... Besides revealing a confidential decision,
the parental notice requirement may limit 'access to the means of effectuating that
decision.' Many minor women will encounter interference from their parents after the
state imposed notification. In addition to parental disappointment and disapproval,
the minor may confront physical or emotional abuse, withdrawal of financial support,
or actual obstruction of the abortion decision. Furthermore, the threat of parental
notice may cause some minor women to delay past the first trimester of pregnancy,
after which the health risks increase significantly. Other pregnant minors may at-
tempt to self-abort or to obtain an illegal abortion rather than risk parental notifica-
tion. Still others may forsake an abortion and bear an unwanted child, which, given
the minor's 'probable education, employment skills, financial resources and emotional
resources, . . . may be exceptionally burdensome.'
Id. at 1186-87 (citations omitted).
The results of a 1978 nationwide survey by the Alan Guttmacher Institute support Justice
Marshall's analysis:
In 1978, 184,000 teenagers aged 17 and younger obtained abortions. Applying the
survey findings to this group, we find that about 103,000 of these teenagers did so
with their parents' knowledge. Based on these findings, if parental notification re-
quirements were adopted by all abortion providers, an additional 39,000 young people
might be expected to inform their parents about their decision to have an abortion.
An even higher number, however-42,000-would not obtain a legal abortion. Some
19,000 of these could be expected to attempt to obtain an illegal abortion or to induce
the abortion themselves-both, desperate and dangerous alternatives. Another 18,000
would have an unwanted birth and . . .another 5,000 would run away from home,
presumably to have an unwanted birth or to obtain an illegal abortion.
Torres, Forrest & Eisman, Telling Parents: Clinic Policies and Adolescents' Use of Family
Planning and Abortion Services, 12 FAM. PLAN. PERSPECTIVES 284 (1980).
51. 101 S. Ct. at 1173. Conversely, state action encouraging childbirth except in the most
urgent circumstances is rationally related to the legitimate government objective of protect-
ing potential life. Harris v. McRae, 100 S. Ct. 2671, 2692 (1980).
52. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-5(4)(f) (1977).
53. Justice Marshall disagreed:
Choosing to participate in diagnostic tests involves risks to both mother and child,
and also may burden the pregnant woman with knowledge that the child will be
handicapped .... The decision to undergo surgery to save the child's life certainly
carries as serious 'emotional and psychological consequences' for the pregnant adoles-
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concluded that "the statute plainly serves important state interests, is
narrowly drawn to protect only those interests, and does not violate any
of the guarantees of the Constitution."'"
Justice Powell, joined by Justice Stewart, wrote a separate opinion em-
phasizing that he concurred in the majority opinion only because the rul-
ing left open the question of the constitutionality of the statute as ap-
plied to mature minors and to minors whose best interests would not be
served by parental notification." Justice Stevens concurred in the judg-
ment of the Court but did not join with the majority because he found
the Utah statute constitutionally valid as applied to all members of the
class of unmarried minor women suffering unwanted pregnancies. 51
IV. SCOPE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVACY RIGHTS OF A MINOR
When the state regulates the activities of minors, the question of
whether constitutional rights have been violated is complicated by the
additional concerns of safeguarding parental rights57 and protecting the
minor from his own immaturity and vulnerability which might limit a
meaningful exercise of those constitutional rights. The Court has unam-
biguously stated that although constitutional rights are not instantly be-
stowed at the statutory age of majority,5 8 the scope of a minor's right
cent as does the decision to abort.
101 S. Ct. at 1190 n.38 (citations omitted).
54. Id. at 1173.
55. Id. at 1173-74. Justice Powell's constitutional analysis balanced the competing inter-
ests of the minor, the state and the parents, none of which were absolute. If the statute was
found to be an invalid burden per se on the right of the minor to make the abortion deci-
sion, the minor's wishes would become virtually absolute and all other interests would be
disregarded. Justice Powell therefore contended that the state cannot require notice to par-
ents in all cases, or in none. The individual's age, maturity, mental and physical condition,
the stability of her home and her relationship with her parents are all circumstances rele-
vant to evaluating the minor's ability to make the abortion decision independently. In ac-
cord with his Bellotti opinion, Justice Powell concluded that an independent decisionmaker
should be provided in order to give the minor an opportunity to show that she is mature
enough to make the decision independently or that notification would not be in her best
interests. Id. at 1176-77.
56. Id. at 1179. Justice Stevens found the state interests substantial and fundamental,
thus outweighing any negative impact on the minor. The constitutional protection afforded
the abortion decision merely emphasized its importance and created a special justification
for reasonable state efforts to ensure that it was wisely made. Id. at 1178. In Stevens' opin-
ion, the statute was not fatally defective even though some minors may be "sufficiently ma-
ture to make a well-reasoned abortion decision" or despite the fact that some parents may
not respond receptively. Id. at 1179. This conclusion indicates that Justice Stevens did not
require the statute to be closely tailored to the achievement of the state's interests. See text
accompanying note 54 supra.
57. "[T]he guiding role of parents in the upbringing of their children justifies limitations
on the freedoms of minors." Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. at 637. See also note 46 supra.
58. Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74.
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under the Constitution is not equivalent to that of an adult .5 The Court
has not, however, clearly indicated what method of analysis should be
employed to delineate the scope of a minor's constitutional rights. Should
the actual analysis be different than that employed for adults, either be-
cause of the minor's unique status, or perhaps because a minor's right is
deemed less fundamental or important than that of an adult? Or, should
the same analysis be applied as when the constitutional rights of an adult
are burdened with the result possibly altered because of the additional
state interests involved? The decisions and dicta of the Court seem to
have moved toward the latter conclusion at least in the area of privacy
rights.
The question of what analysis is to be used to delineate the scope of a
minor's constitutional right surfaced in the abortion context when the
Danforth majority required a "significant state interest" not present in
the case of an adult to justify interference with a minor's right to an abor-
tion.60 The Danforth decision never actually referred to the right of the
minor as "fundamental" but found that since the articulated state inter-
ests were not enhanced by the parental consent requirement," the statute
restricted the minor's right without sufficient justification. This appeared
to be a downgrading of the strict scrutiny or "compelling state interest"
test which must be satisfied under Roe v. Wade to justify burdening the
"fundamental" right to an abortion.
A year later, in Carey v. Population Services International,"2 the "sig-
nificant state interest" test was again applied. In a plurality opinion, Jus-
tice Brennan noted:
[The] test is apparently less rigorous than the 'compelling state interest'
test applied to restrictions on the privacy rights of adults. Such lesser scru-
tiny is appropriate both because of the States' greater latitude to regulate
the conduct of children ... and because the right of privacy implicated
here is 'the interest in independence in making certain kinds of important
decisions' . . . and the law has generally regarded minors as having a lesser
capability for making important decisions.6 3
Brennan emphasized that this lesser degree of scrutiny did not mean to-
tal deference to the state:
[W]e again confirm the principle that when a State, as here, burdens the
exercise of a fundamental right, its attempt to justify that burden as a ra-
tional means for the accomplishment of some significant state policy re-
quires more than a bare assertion ... that the burden is connected to such
59. See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
60. 428 U.S. at 75.
61. See note 10 supra.
62. 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (New York statute prohibiting sale of contraceptives to minors
found unconstitutional).
63. Id. at 693 n.15 (citations omitted).
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a policy. 4
Justice Powell stated in Carey that the Court's precedents make clear
that the compelling state interest is to be invoked:
only when the state regulation entirely frustrates or heavily burdens the
exercise of constitutional rights in this area. This is not to say that other
state regulation is free from judicial review. But a test so severe that legisla-
tion rarely can meet it should be imposed by courts with deliberate restraint
in view of the respect that properly should be accorded legislative
judgments. 5
Consequently, Powell's subsequent opinion in Bellotti avoided both the
"compelling state interest" test and the "significant state interest" test as
well as any discussion of "fundamental" rights: the Bellotti opinion fo-
cused instead on whether the minor's rights were "unduly burdened" by
the statute.8 Whether an undue burden exists is apparently determined
by balancing the state interests served by the statute against the intru-
sion into the minor's privacy right.
In H. L. v. Matheson, the majority did not directly address which
method of analysis should be applied in evaluating the scope of a minor's
constitutional right or in determining the validity of any statutory in-
fringement of that right. Only the dissent expressly used the label "fun-
damental" to describe the minor's right.6 7 However, the majority, concur-
ring,"' and dissenting opinions all engaged in some balancing of the state
interests advanced by the statute against the burdens imposed on the mi-
nor's right to privacy. Chief Justice Burger enumerated the state interests
and labelled them important, significant and legitimate.69 These labels
appear to be more of an attempt to assign weights to the interests for
purposes of balancing them against the burdens to the minor rather than
an application of any particular test or level of scrutiny. Since the statute
64. Id. at 696 (emphasis added).
65. Id. at 705. Justice Powell's assertion was in reference to constitutional rights in the
area of sexual freedom and abortion in general and not specifically to the rights of minors.
66. 443 U.S. at 640.
67. 101 S. Ct. at 1192, 1194.
68. In his concurring opinion, Justice Powell purportedly focused on whether the consti-
tutional right of the minor was unduly burdened after giving consideration to the competing
interests of the individual minor, the parents and the state. However, he failed to identify
any burden and merely concluded that to hold the statute unconstitutional would essen-
tially ignore any interests other than those of the minor. 101 S. Ct. at 1176-77. See note 55
supra.
Justice Stevens declared that the first task was to identify the statute's impact on the
exercise of a constitutional right and then to evaluate that impact in light of the state inter-
ests underlying the statute. He proceeded to evaluate the state's interests which he found to
be "fundamental" and "substantial". However, he failed to assess the impact on the minor
other than to declare that the fact that some parents may react negatively to the notifica-
tion did not diminish the legitimacy of the state's effort. Id. at 1177-79. See note 56 supra.
69. Id. at 1172-73. See text accompanying notes 47 & 48 supra.
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did not allow for a veto of the minor's decision, the Court found that
privacy rights were not so substantially burdened as to outweigh the
state's interests.
The most disciplined constitutional analysis in H. L. v. Matheson is
found in the dissent. Justice Marshall reiterated the "significant state in-
terest" test of Danforth and the Roe v. Wade requirement that the state
demonstrate that the means selected be closely tailored to the state inter-
est being promoted.7 0 He stated that "[a]lthough it may seem that the
minor's privacy right is somehow less fundamental because it may be
overcome by a 'significant state interest,' the more sensible view is that
the state interests inapplicable to adults may justify burdening the mi-
nor's right. '71 After carefully assessing the burdens imposed on the mi-
nor 2 and the interest asserted by the State of Utah, Justice Marshall
found that each state interest was ill-fitted to serve their purpose and
hence insufficient justification for the intrusion on the minor's right.7 1
The Court has apparently avoided labelling the minor's right to privacy
as "fundamental" because of that label's association with automatically
invoking strict scrutiny and the compelling state interest test which is
almost always fatal to state legislation. 4 To avoid this result in the area
of minor's rights, the Court initially rephrased the test to require only a
"significant" state interest to justify burdening the right. However, there
is no logical basis for permitting a lesser state interest to justify burden-
ing rights of minors than would justify burdening those of adults. The
actual reason for permitting a greater burden on minor's rights is because
the state has greater interests where minors are concerned. A far more
sensible and consistent approach of balancing the articulated state inter-
ests against the burdens on the individual has evolved and was employed
in Matheson, although it is unfortunate that it has not been openly em-
braced and employed in a more disciplined manner.
The pattern culminating in Matheson seems to indicate that the Court
has shifted away from the fundamental right-scrict scrutiny analysis of
Roe v. Wade to a flexible due process balancing scheme such as that pro-
posed years ago by Justice Harlan. He outlined four considerations for
determining whether a state regulation has unduly burdened a constitu-
tional right: "First, what is the constitutional source and nature of the
right relied upon? Second, what is the extent of the interference with
that right? Third, what governmental interests are served by [the statu-
tory] requirements? Fourth, how should the balance of the competing
70. 101 S. Ct. at 1188. See notes 55 & 56 supra.
71. 101 S. Ct. at 1188 n.32.
72. See note 50 supra.
73. 101 S. Ct. at 1189-94.
74. See text accompanying note 64 supra.
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considerations be struck?"75 Where a minor's rights are concerned, the
balance is weighted from the start in favor of the state due to its special
interest in protecting minors and promoting family integrity. Minors thus
have the same fundamental privacy rights under the Constitution as
adults but the additional state interests involved where minors are con-
cerned give the state substantial latitude in regulating and in burdening
those rights.
V. IMPLICATIONS OF H. L. v. Matheson
The ruling in H. L. v. Matheson is very narrow and is significant prima-
rily because it indicates that states may permissibly mandate some mini-
mal level of parental involvement in the abortion decision of a minor
child. However, when viewed in conjunction with the individual justices'
positions in Bellotti, Matheson is a good indicator of just how limited
that parental involvement may be.
Only Justice Stevens found that the Utah statute was constitutional as
applied to all minors. The majority opinion in Matheson intimated that
the statute would be unconstitutional when applied to emancipated or
demonstrably mature minors or to those who could show that, because of
a hostile home environment, parental notification would not be in their
best interests.7 6 Justice Powell's concurring opinion, joined by Justice
Stewart, emphasized that he joined the opinion of the Court only with
the understanding that the ruling did not apply to mature minors or to
those whose best interests would not be served by notification.77 Both jus-
tices maintain the opinion Powell expressed in Bellotti, that application
of the statute to those classes of minors would be unconstitutional. Nota-
bly, Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist, part of the Matheson
majority, had also joined in Powell's Bellotti opinion. The dissenters in
Matheson, Justices Marshall, Brennan and Blackmun, expressly found
the Utah statute overbroad as applied to mature minors as well as an
intrusion upon the constitutional rights of all minors.78 Thus, it is clear
that absent a future change in position, a majority of the present Court,
including Justices Burger, Powell, Stewart,7 ' Marshall, Brennan and
75. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 663 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Stew-
art expressly embraced Harlan's balancing scheme in Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 396
(1978) (Stewart, J., concurring). See generally Developments in the Law-The Constitution
and the Family, 93 HARv. L. Rav. 1156, 1193-97 (1980).
76. 101 S. Ct. at 1169-70.
77. Id. at 1173-74.
78. Id. at 1195.
79. Justice Stewart has now been replaced on the Court by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor
whose confirmation hearings concentrated on her stand against criminal abortion laws dur-
ing her tenure as a state legislator. Camper, O'Connor's Senate Trial, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 21,
1981, at 73. Any prediction as to her position on parental notification would be purely
speculative.
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Blackmun,"0 holds that a parental notification statute cannot constitu-
tionally be applied to mature minors nor to those immature minors who
can demonstrate that notification would be clearly against their best in-
terests because of their particular home situation.81
Aside from failing to clearly indicate the Court's method of analysis for
determining the scope of a minor's constitutional rights, the main flaw in
Matheson's limited holding and its implications concerning mature mi-
nors is that the holding does not provide any guidance to state legisla-
tures on constructing a constitutional statute.8 2 Justice Powell outlined a
parental consent statute in Bellotti which he considered to be carefully
drawn to protect only the valid state interests at stake and yet preserve
the minor's constitutional right to privacy.83 In Matheson, Powell em-
braced the same concept, holding that a parental notification statute will
be constitutional as long as provisions are made for a minor to obtain
judicial exemption from the statute by showing her maturity or, alterna-
tively, by demonstrating that the notification would not be in her best
interests.' However, a majority of the Court did not join in Justice Pow-
ell's opinion in Bellotti in which he first articulated his scheme of re-
80. Justice Rehnquist may also be in accord. However, his position is less predictable
since he concurred in Powell's Bellotti opinion only because he felt the lower courts needed
some guidance until the Court was willing to overrule Danforth. Justice White joined the
majority in Matheson but perhaps only because the statute was not invalidated. He was the
sole dissenter in Bellotti and he also dissented in Danforth. However, it may be significant
that he chose not to join Justice Stevens who concurred in the judgment upholding the Utah
statute but also expressly found the statute constitutional as applied to all minors.
81. Since Matheson, the Court has vacated the judgment of the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals which upheld the grant of summary judgment in favor of a constitutional challenge
to Nebraska's parental consultation provision. Women's Services, P.C. v. Thone, 483 F.
Supp. 1022 (D. Neb. 1979), afl'd, 636 F.2d 206 (8th Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded, 49
U.S.L.W. 3911 (1981). The Court remanded the case for reconsideration in light of H.L. v.
Matheson, with Justices Brennan, Blackmun and Marshall dissenting and voting to affirm.
The statute in question, NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-333 (Supp. 1979), required a written state-
ment from any minor under the age of 18 to the effect that she has consulted with her
parents concerning her abortion decision. It further provided that no information in the
statement, including the woman's identity, may be disclosed without her written
authorization.
82. In addition to Utah, seven states presently have parental notification statutes. See
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 81-54 (Smith-Hurd 1981) (held unconstitutional in Wynn v. Carey,
582 F.2d 1375, 1388-90 (7th Cir. 1978)); ME. Rv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1597 (1980) (prelimi-
narily enjoined in Women's Community-Health Center, Inc. v. Cohen, 477 F. Supp. 542,
547-48 (D. Me. 1979)); MD. ANN. CODE art. 43, § 135(d) (1980); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 188.039
(Vernon Supp. 1981) (held unconstitutional in Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 483 F.
Supp. 679, 697 (W.D. Mo. 1980)); MoNT. REv. CODE ANN. § 50-20-107 (1979); NEB. REv.
STAT. § 28-333 (Supp. 1979); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-302(f) (Supp. 1980).
83. 443 U.S. at 647-48. At least two states, both of which had parental notification stat-
utes, have now revised them according to Justice Powell's suggestions in Bellotti. See LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.35.5 (West Supp. 1981); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.1-03.1 (Interim
Supp. 1981).
84. 101 S. Ct. at 1176-77.
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course to an independent decisionmaker." Justice Stevens in particular
finds recourse to the judiciary more intrusive on the privacy of the minor
than parental notification.86
A minor who is determined to withhold knowledge of her pregnancy
from her parents will probably find the alternative of a court appearance
a more frightening and embarrassing experience than a confrontation
with her parents. 87 The necessary time delay is also an important consid-
eration. Aside from the obvious delay involved in obtaining and possibly
appealing a judicial determination, a minor's attempt to choose between
two undesirable alternatives could also result in a delay of a considerable
length of time. Such a delay in the abortion decision could be critical.88
A possible alternative to judicial intervention would be simple reliance
on the mature minor rule which, in many jurisdictions, exists as a statu-
tory89 or judicial exception to parental consent requirements for medical
treatment. The rule permits a physician to give medical treatment to a
consenting minor who demonstrates an understanding of the nature and
consequences of the medical procedure.91 The justification for exempting
mature minors from the abortion parental notification statutes is that a
mature minor is capable of making an independent informed choice
which takes into account the immediate and long-range consequences of
her decision. Thus, the state interest in protecting the mature minor from
improvident choices is not applicable.
A physician should be better qualified than the judiciary to determine
whether his patient is capable of giving informed consent. In Doe v. Bol-
ton, the Court recognized the capacity of the physician to consider "all
factors-physical, emotional, psychological, familial, and the woman's
age-relevant to the well-being of the patient"" in making a medical
judgment regarding the advisability of abortion. Since the physician is
85. Powell's opinion was joined by only three other justices.
86. See text accompanying note 25 supra.
87. See Comment, The Maine Abortion Statutes of 1979: Testing the Constitutional
Limits, 32 ME. L. REv. 315, 350-51 (1980).
88. Mortality rates for abortion increase by almost 40 percent with each week of gesta-
tion. C. TmTz, INDUCED ABORTION 83 (3d ed. 1979).
89. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-363(g) (1981); Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-41-3(h) (1973).
The statutes typically provide that any "minor of sufficient intelligence to understand and
appreciate the consequences of the proposed surgical or medical treatment or procedures"
may consent independently to treatment.
90. As a judicial exception, the rule has been invoked primarily as a defense by the physi-
cian to tort actions brought by the minor's parents. Courts generally will not apply the
exception unless the minor is at least 15 years old and the treatment is not serious in na-
ture. Brown & Truitt, The Right of Minors to Medical Treatment, 28 DE PAUL L. REv. 289
(1979).
91. See generally Wilkins, Children's Rights: Removing the Parental Consent Barrier to
Medical Treatment of Minors, 1975 ARiz. ST. L.J. 31, 37-39, 49-57.
92. 410 U.S. 179, 192 (1973).
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subject to traditional common law remedies for operating on a minor who
is not capable of giving informed consent,93 he has a vested interest in
making a good faith determination of maturity. However, the risk in-
volved in an erroneous determination is one that many physicians would
be unwilling to take and thus a mature minor may find that her access to
abortion is very limited unless she involves her parents. For this reason,
the mature minor rule is not likely to provide a feasible solution to ex-
empting mature minors from parental notification statutes unless the
physician is insulated from liability, absent a clear abuse of discretion. In
the case of immature minors who claim that parental notification would
not serve their best interests, judicial recourse would be the only option
since a physician is not qualified to make that determination. Only the
minor from the hostile home environment who is fearful of an extremely
negative parental response would be likely to find resort to the judiciary a
less intimidating experience than a confrontation with her parents.
VI. CONCLUSION
H. L. v. Matheson held that the state can require parental notification
before an immature, dependent minor is permitted to obtain an abortion.
However, because the case implied that mature minors and minors from a
hostile home environment cannot constitutionally be subject to the same
requirement, the end result may in essence be that parental notification
cannot constitutionally be mandated.
Recourse to the judiciary as a means of exempting mature minors from
the statutory requirement should be found to be as burdensome as paren-
tal notification and hence unconstitutional unless the Courts retreats
from its Roe v. Wade pronouncement that the abortion decision is encom-
passed in a fundamental right to privacy." The only other option, reli-
ance on the physician's determination of his patient's capacity to give in-
formed consent, necessitates a statutory provision to protect the
physician from liability absent a clear abuse of discretion. In this event,
abortions would essentially become available to all but the clearly incom-
petent minor without the requirement for parental notice. Hence the ex-
ception appears likely to swallow the rule.95
Gail Harrington Miller
93. E.g. Bonner v. Moran, 126 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1941). See generally W. PROSSER, THE
LAw OP TORTS § 18, at 102-03 (4th ed. 1971).
94. See text accompanying notes 24 & 25 supra.
95. The better course would be to apply the same standard for minors seeking abortion
that is applied in many jurisdictions for minors seeking treatment for venereal disease or
drug abuse. The physician should request permission from the minor to notify her parents.
If she objects, then he should only insist on notifying the parents before performing the
abortion if the minor is judged incapable of giving informed consent or if he concludes that
the health of the girl may be seriously endangered. See IJA-ABA JUVNILE JUSTIC STAN-
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DARDS, THE RIGHTS OF MINORS, Standard 4.2 (1981). For a statutory proposal and a review
of state-mandated, parental involvement statutes, see Lozano, Abortions for Minors After
Bellotti II: An Analysis of State Law and a Proposal, 11 ST. MARY'S L.J. 946 (1980).
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